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AESTHETICIZED TRAGEDY (KARUṆARASA)
AS AN INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE
LISA WIDDISON

ABSTRACT: In contemporary virtue epistemology, responsibilist intellectual virtues in the
tradition of Aristotle's moral theory are acquired character traits involving a motivational
component and a success component. The motivational component is an emotion that regulates
inquiry but which would ordinarily, and problematically, carry bias. In order to monitor the
patterns of fallibility in emotions, reflection can correct beyond perceptual errors or logical
fallacies. Emotions which survive reflection are less partial and hold more epistemic valance
than egotistical emotions. Since the framework of virtue epistemology might be at a loss for
monitoring emotions reflectively, given the fact emotions operate rapidly and tend to bypass
cognitive functions, a theory of non-cognitive, egoless emotions, such as the Sanskrit aesthetic
theory of rasa is a useful paradigm for epistemic value. Aestheticized emotions (rasa-s) have a
place in emotion-evaluation. In particular, Abhinavagupta's realistic analysis of the
aestheticized emotion of pathos (karuṇarasa) in the Abhinavabhāratī, shows that, “aestheticized
tragedy,” unlike ordinary compassion or pity, is an immersive but moving higher-order
affective response that involves evaluating the transitions from one unreflective emotion to the
next. The cognitive fallout for related virtues, such as compassion, is that karuṇa affords insight
into the process of transformation. Subsequently, it is possible to articulate a new kind of
intellectual virtue, one that regulates observation, anticipates attunement with sentient beings,
and adds insight to the evaluative structure of pathos.
Keywords: emotion, intellectual virtue, karuṇa, rasa, Sanskrit aesthetics, taste and the sublime,
virtue epistemology

[तमसा] अहो संिवधानकम ।
एको रसः करुण एव िनिमत्तभेदािद्भन्नः पृथक्पृथिगवाश्रयते िववतार्न् ।
आवतर्बुद्बद
ु तरङ्गमयािन्वकारानम्भो यथा सिललमेव तु तत्समग्रम् ।।
भवभूित, उत्तररामचिरत ३-४७
________________________
WIDDISON, LISA: Lecturer of Philosophy, University of Hawaiʻi-West Oʻahu, USA. Email:
lisa888@hawaii.edu
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[Tamasā speaking] How confusing!
Only one rasa, karuṇa, on account of different causes one after the next
persists like it rests in change. But on the whole it is only a flow,
just as water in a whirlpool assumes the form of waves and bubbles.1
Bhavabhūti, Uttararāmacarita 3.47
1. THE RASA THEORY OF AESTHETIC APPRECIATION
An “intellectual virtue” is a human good of flourishing and happiness that can be
theorized in different ways, though the idea perennially includes character traits of
wisdom or a capacity for understanding. When some contemporary virtue theorists
inspired by Aristotle’s conception looked closely at the ways virtuous capacities might
guide inquiry to reach understanding, they found that affective judgments about a cause
for pleasure or pain, i.e., emotions, are present as motivational factors (as noted in the
Nicomachean Ethics). Sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary, emotions can
be cultivated. “Emotion” cultivated as a judgment of value in exercising virtue can be
articulated either morally or intellectually. (Zagzebski, 1996) Intellectual virtues are
critical in certain kinds of virtuous understanding that requires an agent, like knowledge
of other people. (Dalmiya, 2001) The epistemically virtuous agent is someone who can
be credited for avoiding error and reaching truth by an ability to inquire willingly and
responsibly. For theorizing motivational emotions in virtue epistemology, the new
insight from classical Sanskrit poetics is that some of an agent’s epistemological
emotions are also aesthetic.
Critical emphasis on the distinctly aesthetic quality of very different kinds of
emotion (e.g., the erotic, comic, horrific, tragic etc.) has created a discourse around
aestheticized emotions, the core of which is nowadays widely known from Sanskrit as
rasa theory, or simply rasa. The saying, “happiness is like water” jalam iva sukham in
Sanskrit expresses the fluid nature of positive emotions that is ordinarily difficult to
maintain. It also expresses another direction of rapture, a more extraordinarily
impossible to contain response to reach out to others in aesthetic appreciation. Rasa
bubbles over from narratives of turmoil and tranquility. Bharata’s list of eight distinct
but interwoven rasa-s, all of which have general ordinary counterparts on a
paradigmatic palette of dispositional emotions (sthāyibhāva), can be taken as kinds of
aesthetic judgments because as Kant claimed, the imaginative faculty--a condition of
the experiencing subject--refers only to a quality of beauty, or alternately of one’s own
sublimity.2
1

Act 3.47. Kale (2003, 41) translates the same verse as follows: “The one sentiment of pathos
[karuṇarasa] divided by a diversity of causes, undergoes different variations, as water assumes the
different conditions of eddies, bubbles and waves, and it is all, never the less, but water.”
2
In the Critique of Judgment (CJ) Kant claims the pleasure of taste is a subjective condition of the judger
herself: “an ability to judge an object in reference to the free lawfulness of the imagination” (1790, 240).
A judgment of taste (by the ability to judge an object, or a way of presenting it, by means of a liking or
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In rasa, the subjective conditions for being carried away, rapture, or more
descriptively, for having real embodied emotions that are reflective, is a contemplative
possibility by enacting dispositional traces (vāsanā). The occurrence of rasa, depends
on latent dispositions which are called the sthāyibhāva-s: rati (love/rapture), hāsa
(mirth/laughter), śoka (sorrow), krodha (anger), utsāha (enthusiasum), bhaya (fear),
jugupsā (revulsion), vismaya (astonishment), and śama or nirveda (a special form of
tranquility or equanimity). Rasa-s include: śṛṅgāra (the erotic/romantic), hāsya
(comedy), karuṇa (tragedy/pathos), raudra (ferociousness), vīra (heroism), bhayānaka
(horror), bībhatsa (disgust), adbhuta (wonder), and controversially, śānta (tranquility
or quietude).3 Rasa-s have a general relation to ordinary emotions, but differ in that
rasa is not evoked to account for merely personal, or mundane experiences. 4
Aestheticization (the process of generalization to affectively reach a quality of beauty
or sublimity) transforms the potentially painful emotions that artists find ways suggest
into contemplative happiness. Karuṇa, the emotion with tragedy as an aestheticized artobject, is grounded in a capacity to feel painful emotions, and yet karuṇa is not a painful
experience. Rather, the bittersweet taste of tragedy becomes refined in karuṇa.
Aestheticization reflectively liquifies forms of suffering imagined through the emotion
palate of a connoisseur. On its path of inquiry, understanding may be shared in the
stories we tell.
‘Rasa’ as ‘aesthetic-emotion’ was formally introduced in the Nāṭyaśāstra (NS), a
canonical and comprehensive text on dramaturgy (c.200 BCE - 200 CE) by
Bharatamuni (the sage Bharata). Subsequently, rasa theory has been applied to a
variety of arts, including poetry, narrative, dance, music, sculpture, painting and of
course, theater. Ordinarily, rasa can mean a sap, taste, flavor, liquid, juice, medicinal
tonic, joy or rapture. Relating the rasa of theater to an elixir, Bharata put a descriptive
vocabulary into place with the analogy of cooking, in which raw ingredients are

disliking devoid of all interest) makes use of the productive power of the imagination, apart from the
aspect responsible for bringing about the recognition of a concept, the reproductive imagination. The
object of such a liking, according to Kant is called by the quality beautiful. (1790, 211).
3
Bharata explicitly mentions only eight, the ninth emotion of tranquility is defended in Abhinavagupta’s
commentary on the NS, the Abhinavabhratī VI. There we see śāntarasa emerge following his critique
of views regarding rasa production. His commentary on the NS is itself a canonical text, as a synthesis
of opposing views, with insights into the polemics of lost commentaries, such as Bhaṭṭanāyaka’s
Sahṛdayadarpaṇa.
4
All cultures account for some basic feelings, such as “fear” or “love,” the particulars of which need not
be universally shared. Yet in a sense the rasa experience is taken as a break from even those particulars
of ordinary or worldly relations. An array of ordinary emotion-states (bhāva) is part of the background
of any audience, not merely because of cultural conditions nor because of a neuro-biological basis of
affective response for sorting emotion-types, like the emotion scheme Paul Ekman proposed where basic
emotions have a scientific basis in evolutionary biology. (Ekman 1999, 46). Jesse Prinz rejects a purely
biological basis for emotions, not by fully arguing for a cultural basis, but instead to say that emotions
are both conditioned, and culturally informed (Prinz, 2004). The ontology of rasa is also such that
producing aesthetic enjoyment is both biologically and culturally informed, yet transcendental according
to Abhinava.
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transformed in the kitchen to manifest something relishable.5 Though the “Rasa Sūtra”
of Bharata’s NS VI.32 (tatra vibhāvānubhāva vyabhicāri samyogād rasaḥ niṣpattiḥ),
omits reference to stable emotion dispositions, the aphorism intimates that rasa is the
essence of an agent, one who affectively judges the cause-effect conditions of
emotions.
Instead of pointing out stable emotion dispositions that usually motivate a person,
the “Rasa Sūtra” indicates that the conjunction (samyoga) of necessary conditions:
determinants (aesthetic objects, vibhāva-s), consequents (possible experiences,
anubhāva-s), and fleeting emotion states (viabhicāribhāva-s) is sufficient for audience
rapport. The result is a “refined” or “cooked” emotion-essence that a spectator feels in
art-experiences. This is aesthetic pleasure (rasāsvāda) as a sentimentally construed
tasting experience. For example, a desolate Ophelia by the riverbank, ornate dress and
symbolic flowers are examples of aesthetic objects. A possible experience, or effect is
her being driven to suicide. Although “karuṇa,” is occasionally mis-transliterated or
translated as the moral virtue, i.e., karuṇā/compassion, the aesthetic idea “karuṇa” is a
relishable sap of sadness, or tragedy, and not a moral virtue.6 If the aesthetic emotion
of karuṇa leads to moral virtue then it may well be because aestheticizing tragedy,
which need not be a moral act, is an intellectual act, one that moves an agent
emotionally. The rasa formula captures ‘a spectator’ as one whose body engages
empatheticaly.
When looking at a performance or painting of Ophelia, the gestures on Ophelia’s
face and hands, which seem involuntary, elicit an embodied response in terms of
spectator-emotion.7 The audience, who is attuned to, and reflectively aware of a tragedy
unfolding, should feel a certain shock of understanding when they see Ophelia. Yet it
would be a mistake to assume that there is a mimetic symmetry between art and life.
Theoretically distinguishable from “personal” emotions, rasa-s are real ‘transpersonal’
emotional responses to experiences that are pictured through spectators’ imaginative
engagement with art, even about the un-experienceable. According to Abhinavagupta,
it is a fact about rasa that a spectator can be further immersed in a particular
5

vyañjanauṣadhisaṁyogo yathānnam svādutāṁ nayet/ evaṁ bhāvā rasāścaiva bhāvayanti
parasparam// NS 6.37
6
On the matter of translating karuṇa as “tragedy” see Indian Poetics and Western thought (Kushwaha
1988, 130). There, A.C. Sukla renders karuṇarasa to be ‘tragic Joy.’ If not a stronger view of karuṇa as
a moral then atleast a comparative basis between the philosophies of Aristotle and Abhinavagupta is
supported by Geoff Ashton and Sonja Tanner in Philosophy East & West (2016, 13-39).
7

Artist: Sir John Everett Millais, Bt 1829–1896 Ophelia Oil on Canvas 1851–2 Tate, London Presented
by Sir Henry Tate1894 Reference N01506
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configuration of emotions which has lessons for every aspect of life, wealth or power
(artha), pleasure (kāma), duty or responsibility (dharma) and liberation (mokṣa), while
transcending the trappings of merely personal emotions to which these human aims
may refer (e.g., greed, lust, and bias).8 He stresses the possibility for spiritual progress
in the rasa experience, but in any case, there is a secular intellectual value in rasa for
enjoyment.
Recently, Vittorio Gallesi has claimed that embodied simulation is relevant to
aesthetics both through mirror mechanisms, and through symbol making gestures.
“Beholders’ eyes catch not only information about the shape, direction, and texture of
the cuts or strokes, but by means of embodied simulation they breach into the actual
motor expression of the artist when creating the artwork. The sensory-motor
component of image perception together with the jointly evoked emotional reaction
allow beholders to feel the artwork in an embodied manner.” (2017, 193) Gallesi argues
that the mirroring mechanisms generate an “intentional attunement” that is suitable for
embodied simulation. Recognition of other selves, intersubjective communication and
implicit understanding is supposed to be possible on this track of empathy. (2017, 188189) Research compiled by Despina Stamatopoulou shows: “As such, aesthetic
experiences can become a field of ‘becoming instead of being’, when the motivational
urge to act upon (feeling for the other) gets back to the beholder to be ‘played within’,
as potentialities of vicarious I-feelings, while the beholder retains the ‘intersubjective
ties’ with the art object (engagement).” (2017, 184)9 Aesthetic experience stands at the
“edge of action” but it still motivates. Thus, Samatopoulou believes that a receptive
self stays at the background, feeding into a hypothetical imagination while becoming
attuned to art-objects. Likewise, Aristotle considered aesthetic emotion to follow on
cognizance of a possibility, or “as if” mode, which makes use of the imagination, but
does not determine anything about the way things necessarily are, have been, or will
be. The powers of cognizing objects of art, and ruminating on the meaning is just
contemplative. The process of generalization in Sanskrit (sādhāraṇīkārana) 10 is
emphasized by Abhinavagupta as transcendental, but Aristotle also maintains that
aesthetic experience is a different way of seeing, or being in the world.
Rae Langton also discusses the roles the empathetic observer can navigate,
sometimes based on the thought: “I could have been someone else” which is
imaginable, if not impossible. “The illusion, if it is an illusion, is not obvious. And we
can wonder, also, if there would be a price to pay for its banishment.” (2018, 100-101)
Failures of the imagination are an incalculable loss to the agent that cannot be gauged
in terms of assessing numbers of beliefs that are factual.11 The Aristotelian notion of
8

Agreeing with Bhāmaha, Abhinavagupta says in commentary (on Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka)
about suggesting emotion in Locana, “knowledge and pleasure for the reader are both present” that
incidentally confers skill in the knower of each of the above aims. Masson and Patwardhan (1969, 54)
9
Stamatopoulou (2017) is not specifically considering rasa, the above insights are generally descriptive
account, and serve to support a unity to aesthetic exprerience across differing conditions.
10
‘Sādhāraṇībhāvaḥ’ is a technical term for Abhinavagupta, in Abhinavabhāratī., 1.107
11
Arindam Chakrabarti suggests that given our natural process of mind-reading, we seem to read others’
feelings, quite easily, reliably though fallibly through: facial/muscular mimicry and emotional contagion,

Comparative Philosophy 13.1 (2022)

WIDDISON

82

‘possibility’ in the Poetics, is critical for a spectator who changes as a knower, makes
reappraisals and based on reflection, and questions courses of action. But more in tune
with the rasa theorist, Samatopoulou emphasizes that the self is de-centered. The
deeper metaphysical commitment of Abhinavagupta holds that it is unproblematic to
allow that there can be a dissolution of the distinction between “I” and “You” without
a loss of Self. Decentering the Self chimes with the fact that rasa-s “life-lessons” are
free of cost, or at no personal loss.
As with most accounts of aesthetic enjoyment, the rasa experience is thought to be
inherently pleasurable even when negative emotions of fear and pity are conjured up.
Real-life horror motivates a different kind of response than the reflective horror an
audience feels, and even enjoys. An audience can relish the horrific sight of Medea or
Othello’s jealous rage, but to actually take pleasure in watching a crime of passion
would be a perverse, irrational response. The reason by which no one rushes to the
stage to stop Othello from choking Desdemona in a compelling performance, is an
aesthetically normative moment to continue judging with feeling.
Rasa theory explains the appearance-reality distinction as only part of an audience’s
imaginative engagement with a dramatic performance. A discriminating audience can
distinguish between appearance and reality, but also the reality of one’s own desires
from the aesthetic emotion. Abhinavagupta claims that closely identifying with
characters in a play through personalized emotions constitutes one of seven major
obstacles to aesthetic enjoyment, hindering an audience’s rasa experience.12 The seven
opposing-states that interfere with the process of rasa appreciation are: (1) Thinking
that a narrative (e.g., that the rage of Medea) is factually impossible or unimaginable;
(2) Thinking of a narrative only historically; (3) Taking the rapture as a private
emotion; (4) Insensitivity; (5) Unclarity; (6) Seeming irrelevant to purposes of life; and
(7) Doubt that an aesthetic construction (artwork) works as engaging.13 Abhinavagupta
builds on this theoretical framework in categorizing emotions to support the position
that the rasa-bhāva distinction is a result of a perspectival shift away from spatiallytemporarily thinking about persons, places, etc. It can be an awakening to the timeless
beauty, or the spiritual underpinnings of art. Like meaning which is not lost when it is
shared, enjoyment will overflow because rasa appreciation is disinterested personally,
but the agent remaind interested. Pace Bijoy Boruah (2016), trans-personal emotions
can constitute judgments in art-experiences, just as ordinary emotions are said to
constitute evaluative judgments about one’s own (mostly selfish) vulnerabilities in
eye-direction detection, shared attention mechanism, face-reading cues, theory-deployment, and
simulation (imaginative role-reversal). Cautiously, we could “propose a newly recognized but
perennially used knowledge-source or pramāṇa: EMPATHY, which is a mixture of all six of these. That
solves the epistemological problem [of knowing others].” (2015, 108) However, the aesthetic turn to
reflective emotions seems to be critical even for embodied knowledge.
12
Pace Abhinavagupta in the Abhinavabhratī VI, it is by circumventing the objective impediments of
the ego obstacles (vighna) to personal distancing and aesthetic immersion are removed.
13
Arindam Chakrabarti summarizes these points (2009, 197, and 2016, 11-12) from Abhinavabhāratī,
6.32. narrated beginning on page 274 Baroda ed.
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ordinary experiences (Nussbaum, 2018). Instead of being merely personal, rasa-s can
be read as reflective, and open-ended judgments of taste.
Bharata and Abhinavagupta, elucidate the respective distinction between aesthetic
emotion (rasa) and ordinary emotion (bhāva) systematically in two chapters of the NS
(VI, the “Rasādhāya” and VII, the “Bhāvādhāya”). Though scholars tend to focus the
former, in the overlooked seventh chapter a theory of emotion contagion, with fortynine common states, accounts for the connection between the two kinds of experiences.
Freely attending (in the Kantian sense of imaginative free play) to the causal relations
between one emotion and the next puts the experiencer who is imagining causes, effects
and pop-up emotions of surprise and shock, in a state of rest in pure subjectivity without
an objectified goal. As S.C. Sen Gupta points out in “Hamlet in the Light of Indian
Poetics” (Kushwaha ed., 1988, 260-1), the hero’s torturing of Ophelia is a form of selflaceration.14 Clearly, his self-harm results as from any harm to a self-related other.
Abhinavagupta famously concurs with the lack of basis for directly seeing a self as not
also “I”. Imaginatively, the experience is complete like a moment of a yogin’s
understanding, and no lack in awareness, even to have the lack of pain, is is desired.
For a spectator qua inquiring rasika, communal enjoyment motivates extra attention
due to relations of suffering, as much if not more than the soteriological aims of art;
rasa-s are a transcendent avenue to yogic bliss, similar to the experience of supreme
Brahman. Any rasa is to be experienced by anyone, including radically different kinds
of folks.
2. ORDINARY COMPASSION AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE (IVS)
Feeling with others and for others is a one of the ways we navigate the world. Since
knowledge of reality depends on an intersubjective grasp of the world beyond one’s
own perspective, knowledge of others in an epistemic community is critical. Ordinarily,
emotions express vulnerabilities and convey pleasure or displeasure to others. Thus,
the first substantial link between compassion and inquiry is the motivated disposition
to know the reality of others. Unlike selfish pity, some knowledge, especially that of
other minds, is dependent on openness and alignment. Not being about art-experience,
ordinary compassion takes the form of empathy in instances of knowing the needs of
others. According to Amy Coplan, “Only empathy that combines affective matching,
other-oriented perspective-taking, and self–other differentiation provides experiential
understanding.” (2011, 17) That is, one’s own feeling provides knowledge of how
others feel and will act. On the track of empathy, we might know others as intentional
directly from perceiving their feelings. According to Zahavi and Gallagher:
Empathy is defined as a form of intentionality in which one is directed towards the other’s
lived experiences. Any intentional act that discloses or presents the other’s subjectivity
from the second-person perspective counts as empathy. Although empathy, so understood,
is based on perception (of the other’s bodily presence) and can involve inference in difficult
14

This is a key comparative Sanskrit-Shakspearean study beyond pathos that considers the ontological
analysis of pain and the rasa technical process of generalization through pain-bearing characters.
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or problematic situations (where one has to work out how another person feels about
something), it is not reducible to some additive combination of perception and inference.
(2008, 183)

We can add that as a virtue compassion thickens empathy. Compassion is when
empathizing successfully aligns with the feelings of others to create a balanced
understanding of how to help, and is transformed into actions of assistance. Though
Aristotle did not speak of compassion as an intellectual virtue, he did theorize the
relatively non-virtuous emotion of ‘pity’entailing cognizance of the undeserved
suffering of another (Rhetoric, Book 2, Ch. VIII, Poetics). Pity is a self-other regarding
emotion of dread, recurring as the generalized feeling of pathos through a productive
act of mimesis in the context of aesthetics. But contemporary virtue epistemologists
rightfully welcome ordinary compassion as an IV in Aristotelian terms. Roberts and
Woods describe the framework of compassion as the evaluative perception of another’s
vulnerabilities, such as noticing when harm might be done:
Aristotle allows at least two different kinds of ‘‘cognition’’ as exemplifying practical
wisdom. It is a power of deliberation (bouleusis; see Nicomachean Ethics 1139a12–15),
but also a power of perception (aisthésis; see 1142a25–30). Deliberation is an activity, but
perception involves an element of passivity. This mixture of activity and passivity is typical
of virtue exemplifications. For example, the compassionate person deliberates how best to
help somebody in trouble, and then acts intentionally on the result of his deliberation; but
also, spontaneously and involuntarily, he notices people’s troubles where less
compassionate people do not notice, and spontaneously and involuntarily wants to help.
(306, 317) 15

Compassion as an intellectual virtue of relating suffering to vulnerabilities connects the
two kinds of cognition, deliberation (as a kind of reflection) and perception (which
based in feeling). Thus, ordinary compassion is direct perception of particular bodies
and deliberation about their needs that is motivated by a passivity, or suffering. It is not
a joy, nor a generalized tragedy.
As Emmanuel Housset comments, unlike pity that is about a distant other,
compassion as we know it in ordinary life is a feeling for a particular, and separate,
other. “Consequently, compassion is never that disinterested love of humanity in
general…its aim is not to love an impersonal essence or what man could become
beyond his weaknesses, but to love the concrete individual person as he gives himself,
with his unique history and flesh.” (2011, 81) Furthermore, compassion cannot be
unselfish if it is motivated by pain in seeing the suffering of another. The com of
passion is a feeling passion, or passivity with others, not that pain of others. And if
unhappiness with another unhappiness is the basis of a virtue, then the pain motivating
assistance is not homogenous, but multiplied out of proportion, and biased. Taking a
15

Robert C. Roberts & W. Jay Wood discuss the IV of compassion through the lens of an observant
Professor participating in Stanley Milgram’s experiments who resisted punishing students to the point
of administering shocks.
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cue from Aristotle’s virtue theory, Linda Zagzebski has claimed that a “motive” in
inquiry is “an emotion or feeling that initiates and directs action towards an end.”
(1996, 131)16 Since every inquiry needs to be initiated, there is a mismatch between
impartial inquiry into the nature of suffering and unselfishness. However, karuṇarasa
evades this criticism, and works as a transcendental condition for the possibility for real
compassion, without itself being compassion.
The Buddhist virtue of having compassion, karuṇā can further problematize what
we take to be ordinary compassion, but it need not. Though the Four Noble Truths
correctly state that life involves suffering (śoka), transforming a tragic circumstance
into wisdom takes understanding. Śoka is the experience of suffering, conceptualized
as a background emotion-disposition in rasa theory. Śāntideva claims: “There is no
doubt that those whose selfhood is compassion have taken this entire world for
themselves…” (Skilton, 1995, 61-2)17 For an aesthete also, karuṇa could be an avenue
to the aim of great compassion (karuṇā) if judgments then encompass all beings as if
containing the whole world universally. While the whole world may in fact be
aestheticized in a narrative, and encompassed in an act of tragic joy, the Buddhist
response resists the transcendent otherworldly explanation that Abhinavagupta posits
in literature (e.g., by taking the Buddhist themed play by Harṣa, the Nāgānanda as an
example where karuṇarasa leads to śāntarasa). In the Pratyabhijñā philosophy of
Abhinagupta, even actual compassion (dayā) flows from the completeness of the self,
not the emptiness of the self. (Ratié, 2009) The nature of the self is an expression of
divine joy (ānandamayi). In moments of sadness there is an inherent savoring to be
realized, not of the ego, but of a willingly recollected forgotten unity with others. This
taste of tragedy (karuṇarasa) may be compassion aestheticized but only in the sense
that the passion in compassion is taken literally to mean a communal disposition
(from Latin pati ‘suffer’) that is transformed. Karuṇarasa is an affective insight of each
and every other’s brokenness from the whole (in for instance, Ophelia’s individual
brokenness from all).
3. AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE
In the sense that there is an ethics of how to know ourselves, theorizing knowledge has
a normative dimension. Aristotle discusses two kinds of virtue in the Nicomachean
Ethics Book II: virtues of thought and virtues of character. 18 On occasion,
16

This is also the point from which St. Thomas begins his reflection on the emotion of love as a reaching
forth, stretching toward some kind of object or “kind of motion toward a thing”.
17
In “Perfection of Forbearance” verse 126) Wisdom and compassion are invariably linked, in Buddhist
thought, because of the ontological identification of saṃsāra with nirvāṇa. For a consideration of the
theory of compassion without reference to aesthetic emotion see Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāram.
18
In particular Book XI also pertains to intellectual virtues. Any virtue requires a corresponding emotion
disposition to be creatively balanced between extremes. The emotion-states of the intellectual virtues
might be ultra-rational in this regard. If virtuous emotions turn out to be inherently pleasurable, as Book
X suggests, a unified theory of intellectual virtue and emotions is still incomplete with what we have
from Aristotle. The processing of painful emotions to be integrated with agency depends on an
intellectual pleasure taken in the act of judging well.
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contemporary virtue epistemology hybridizes the two notions. According to Aristotle,
virtue is a willed state, which posits emotion-dispositions (courage, forbearance, etc.)
at the heart of practical virtues (bravery, endurance, etc.), and consists in a mean
relative to an individual, defined by reference to reason, just as prudent person would
define it. (1107a). The Aristotelian inspired theory in virtue responsibilism (Zagzebski,
1996) requires that an agent embody dispositions for the sake of understanding, and
cultivate character traits that lead to inquiry. Reflective character traits, such as
“consistency” and “carefulness” regulate the ability to inquire well and reach
understanding.
Now Aristotle’s recipe for happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics should have an
uneasy aftertaste for those who also love his aesthetics. He claims that happiness (the
product of virtue) is not found in play diversions. Rather, we need to divert ourselves
so that we can work, and we work to be happy (1176b29-36). “Happiness” is an activity
expressing virtue in a complete life. The activity of study expresses a human being’s
unique virtue and makes complete happiness. ‘Study,’ broadly taken, must aim at a
desired end if not “the supreme objects of knowledge” (1177a20-21). Whatever the
objects of knowledge are, the supreme epistemic virtue is the natural ruler of
faculties—the capacity for understanding heavily shaped by education. Though, as if
diversions are also an avenue to a higher end, in Book II, Aristotle gives some advice
to the man who is not fortunate enough to receive a proper education: Turn to the
poets!19 Why? The simple answer is that human beings need an emotional education in
order to study, learn, and contemplate virtues of inquiry for its own sake. Poetry shakes
up emotions and gets the desire to learn directed at some end, even if only a temporary
one. Then, we puzzle, we practice, and learn how to learn. Though there is also a deeper
picture. Character traits are cognitively significant for epistemology because they
decide the direction of inquiry and right objects of knowledge.20
Intellectual virtue is a trait manifested by learning to take pleasure in a willed state
that decides on the right objects of knowledge or grasping reality as it is. In terms of
feeling, one is oriented to grasp relations non-propositionally. Not that a virtue is not a
mere feeling, because feelings do not determine goodness or truth. For Aristotle, being
a good judge requires a broad education (1095a). At the same time, education should
be specialized, like medical treatment (1180b7-9). This is a connection that may call to
mind the medicinal use of rasa-s in Āyurveda.
Across divergent traditions, a theory of humors runs parallel to a mind-body
alteration in aesthetic appreciation. Channeling emotions has a relation to aesthetic
appreciation and emotional balance. Abhinavagupta claims that it is because karuṇa is
sorrow (i.e., śoka) transformed into a self-fulfilling essence of pathos that we return to
the theater to experience the sap of tragedy. The meaning of refined sorrow is not
19

Quoting Hesiod, Works and Days, Aristotle slyly suggests that the person who lacks a starting point
for understanding virtue (talent or education) and cannot recognize an authority therein, to ‘seek it out’
this way. (1095b)
20
The responsibilist position in contemporary virtue epistemology especially removes emphasis from
true beliefs as the only source of epistemic value. Hookway (2003,187) is another analytic source for
more on character trait/agent centered epistemologies.
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merely that suffering is constitutive of sentient beings, but rather that in order to be
sentient there is first a general condition of enjoyment (camatkāra) in being conscious.
For the rasika, a way of purifying emotions is through the process of refining
consciousness in aesthetic generalization (sādhāraṇīkāraṇa). This implies that every
experience of suffering is a private lack, and there is no common essence of suffering
the way there is for a rasa. Pain is not general, it is particular. Conversely, karuṇa is
the conscious awareness of a power to feel freely that flows between sentient beings.
When an audience grasps Ophelia with imaginative rapport then she becomes part of a
discourse on dispelling obstacles to union with a beloved or achieving freedom from
misunderstanding.
4. KARUṆA: AESTHETICIZED PATHOS AS TRAGEDY
Aristotle was right to see that something cognitive is given in encountering art-objects,
because in a sense it is true that we must jump past a cognitive hurdle to get there but,
aesthetic enjoyment need not terminate in cognition. As a middle-ground, aestheticemotions are not limited to the ‘arousal’ on the part of the spectator, but cognitive
apprehension is no small part of it. When the spectator infers: “that could just as well
be me in that circumstance,” the experience is private or personal, and tragedy comes
at the cost of some pleasure. We could insist the contrast between aesthetic immersion
(tanmayībhāvaḥ) and catharsis is that an audience can be immersed in sorrow minus
the pain (śoka). Tragedy mingles with joy. Previous comparisons with Aristotle’s
concept of pathos and theory of catharsis with the rasa theory of Sanskrit aesthetics
have in fact been made before. (Singal 1977) Points of convergence reveal the
universality of conceptualizing suffering, grief, and pity in aesthetic appreciation
because all sentient beings have the capacity for aesthetic enjoyment insofar as they are
also rational beings, on both counts. We will add that from the virtue perspective, the
judgment is willed and ongoing.
A classic example is of the spectator who is reduced to tears because of the fate of
Oedipus. No matter how many times the connoisseur has seen the play, she will be
transfixed by images showing the basic facts of the story. Unlike particular people, who
are objects of ordinary pity, the particular actor that captures the audience’s imagination
in a presentation of misfortune is irrelevant. In fact, the better one knows just the plot,
and the less one considers the actors personally, the more one will be moved by the
quality of the performance and carried away in rapture. Since suffering is a cyclical
phenomenon (as the Buddhists correctly emphasize), ordinary pity may be one of the
most communally experienced emotion, but it is not pleasant—we avoid occasions of
pity. In the theater, the cycle of this painful emotion is made uniformly pleasurable.
Not that all aesthetic objects have karuṇa or pathos, but the process of aesthetic
generalization is most spread out with karuṇa. Seeing the steps between suffering, and
pity, reveals relations between emotions that might seem unconnected in absence of
reflection. If we look carefully at how we proceed with a presentation of karuṇa from
a particular to a universal, then we find that the agent’s power of pathos in karuṇa
depends on a decentering stance.
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As we saw, Bharata put a descriptive vocabulary into place with the analogy of
cooking, in which raw ingredients (of emotion) are transformed in the kitchen (of the
embodied mind) to manifest something relishable (aestheticized-emotion enjoyment).21
His “Rasa Sūtra” omits reference to stable personal emotions such as pity (śoka). The
recipe for karuṇa-rasa calls for the conjunction of necessary [aesthetic] conditions:
determinants (vibhāva-s) in the sentiment of the tragic, they are the imagined
vulnerabilities of a character plus a hostile environment seen in context), consequents
(anubhāva-s), enacted experiences of harm, and transient states (vyabhicāribhāva-s)
presentations of pain that the spectator senses. Phenomenologically, expressions of
suffering have an empathetic impact because, as cognitive scientists confirm, “Mirror
neurons (and shared representations) are neutral—neither first-nor third-person—they
are activated both for my own action and for observation of the other’s action:
activation of the system simulates the intentional action but not the agent.” (Zahavi
2008, 178) 22 More is needed for a sufficient condition of rasa. A “conjunction”
(saṃyoga) of the determinants, consequents, and transient states (collectively:
vibhāvādi), is the reflective basis for spectator-mirroring of some embodied indicators
of emotions (tears, trembling, etc.) with karuṇa. Famously, in a paradigm example
where Vālmīki was inspired in pathos to compose a couplet, his anger arose on account
of witnessing an insensitive act--a mating bird being killed in idle hunter.
This passage from the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki is often referred for the sake of
exemplifying the process of rasa. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta also make note
of it to illustrate karuṇa. At the start of Rāmāyaṇa Book I, the author-sage Vālmīki
spontaneously discovers the form of a couplet or śloka, through a surprising encounter
when he is immersed in the charm of the forest. Thus, we see the stages of Vālmīki’s
personal transformation drawn out, generating a picture of the theoretical divisions
within the construction of appreciation: artist, protagonist, and audience for the artexperience, by his being moved from pity, to inspired, and then amazed. After emerging
from a bath in an exceptionally clear and lovely pool of the river, Tamasā,23 Vālmīki
witnesses a sorrowful scene: a poor bird’s screech in agony as a hunter directs an arrow
into her mate. ‘Vālmīki’ responds with pity, and aptly expresses it in a spontaneous
verse, cursing the hunter. Describing himself, Vālmīki says: “Then, in the intensity of
this feeling of compassion (karuṇa), the brahman thought, ‘This is wrong.’ Hearing the
krauñca hen wailing, he uttered these words: ‘Since Nishāda, you killed one of this pair
of krauñcas, distracted at the height of passion, you shall not live for very long.’”24
21

vyañjanauṣadhisaṁyogo yathā annam svādutāṁ nayet/ evaṁ bhāvā rasāścaiva bhāvayanti
parasparam// NS 6.37
22
As Zahavi and Gallagher point out: “that the same areas of my brain that are activated when I engage
in intentional action are also activated when I see you perform the same or similar intentional action
[for] ‘shared representations’ in several areas” (2008, 167).
23
A name signifying murky or muddled darkness, see Bhavabhūti quote above where she also names
karuṇa as the single rasa with mutating forms.
24
Tataḥ karuṇa veditvād adharmo ‘yam iti…dvijaḥ niśāmya rudatīṃ krauñcīm idaṃ vacanam abravīt.
Mā niṣāda pratiṣṭhāṃ tvam agamaḥ śāśvatīḥ samāḥ yat krauñca mithunād ekam avadhīḥ kāma
mohitam! (Goldman trans., 2005, 46-47)
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This expression itself becomes an object of contemplation while Vālmīki hears himself
uttering it.
Another verse immediately takes the first as its object: “And even as he stood
watching and spoke in this way, this thought arose in his heart, ‘Stricken with grief for
this bird, what is this I have uttered?”’ He captures the moment of transformation from
a mere personal stance to the aesthetic bliss of a transpersonal stance. The image of a
visionary (Vālmīki), who is in the right place (a beautiful forest), at the right time
(during a disruption), reacting (with shock, anger, sorrow) and the consequent
experience of inspiration, results in the protagonist’s (Vālmīki’s) ordinary experience
of śoka. Critically, Vālmīki makes no ordinary investigation into the matter of poetics,
either. He does not ask how it was that he himself uttered an emotive verse. He clearly
asks what it is. Far from unnamable, Vālmīki puns a neologism on a pathos-like word.
Through extraordinary insight, ordinary pity (śoka), becomes śloka, or verse. Poetic
insight sets into motion a new way of theorizing about emotion. The hunter proved
tastelessness is an affront to any sensitive observer who witnesses the painful imagery.
The move to curse a hunter in rhyme was a response to directly seeing a cause of
suffering. As clue to our contemporary theorizing of compassion as an intellectual
virtue, a śloka can put a break between what has happened, is happening, and will
happen, for our own subjective power of consciousness to consider events
extemporaneously. Narrative and art forms allow a spectator to step outside of a
sequence of events, critically slow down the process for gaining distance, and from one
image to the next, witness the vulnerable relations that experiences of hostility conceal.
If any emotion-ideas are universal in aesthetic theory then a variant of pathos as
sorrow, or pity, is one such instance. In particular, we may be hard pressed to find a
conception of tragedy which is not on every list of basic emotions, let alone aesthetic
ones.25 Aristotle’s notion of pathos also superficially resembles karuṇarasa. Arousing
emotions in an audience is a necessary feature of Aristotelian tragedies, where a
personal emotion, such as pity, is felt at undeserved misfortune, or fear for another like
oneself. (Sorabji, 2000, 24)26 Aristotle argued, just as Abhinavagupta’s predecessor,
Śaṅkuka, that the audience makes an inference based on imitations by actors. 27
Regarding another who has an emotion as the object of pathos, spectators may respond
with a range of shared emotions (Woodruff 2013, 59-63).28 But in Aristotle’s theory,
the eliminative function of catharsis only partially explains the stream of emotions. The
25

Dividing aesthetic emotions into Comedy and Tragedy may be one way to give a culturally informed
structure to reflective emotions. Yet, Woodruff (2013) differientates ‘spectator emotions’ in emotiontheory prior to contrasting ‘ownerless emotions’ with shared emotions in Greek Tragedy (2016).
26
In Poetics VI, 1449b
27
Richard Sorbji helps makes Aristotle’s cognitive stance clear: “both fear and pity are aroused by
showing that suffering has come to someone who is like us (homoious).” Aristotle, unlike the Stoic
Seneca holds that pathos is genuine fear for oneself. As long as the fear is not excessive, it will support
the pity tragedy is supposed to produce. (Sorabji, 2000, 24)
28
Woodruff also claims that Greek theater theory of tragic-emotion is cognitive in the sense of making
judgments: “Especially in the plays of Sophocles, the audience encounters characters who show
compassion.” In the case of an old disgusting Oedipus, those with homes only wish to dive him away,
until Theseus recognizes the generality of ill-luck around being forced to wander (2016, 147).
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inward flow of karuṇarasa is a positive enjoyment of the essence of self, via the
negative shedding of selfish emotions. If in catharsis, emotions are expunged, in the
aesthetic rapture of rasa (camatkāra) they are they are savored.
With every rasa, a personal emotion-disposition of the spectator must be latent for
there to be an experience of savoring. Śṛngāra (the erotic), for instance, is
experienceable only because rati (sexual love), as an emotion-disposition is latent. The
same holds for the aesthetic emotion of ordinary anger (krodha), and the ferocious
(raudra). In discussing karuṇa, in the Abhinavabhāratī, Abhinavagupta speaks of a
similar emotion which is not so much savored, dayā. ‘Dayā’ also means compassion,
and it is informed by a need for rescue, or pity. However, in seeing someone who has
compassion, others do not necessarily follow suit, express and act with care. So too,
the imitation of suffering cannot bring about the feeling of pity. Imitating any emotion
makes a pseudo-rasa (rasābhāsa) only brings laughter. Said against the earlier theorist,
Śankuka, who happens to posit a theory similar to the Aristotelian theory of mimesis,
the cruel act of imitation is actually a comic presentation according to Abhinavagupta.
But the point of the example is to show that aestheticized tragedy, pathos or karuṇa, is
not an imitation, nor is dayā the latent disposition (śoka) that karuṇa would imitate.
Like the erotic sentiment (śṛṇgāra), the word ‘sexy’ merely denotes a meaning that is
unable to make “sexiness” just by naming it.
Karuṇa does not arise from imitating or naming dayā, but rather from seeing
connections between hurt, separation and tragedy constituting sorrow (śoka), and
anticipating other sentiments such as anger, wrath, or fury (raudra). When Medea
rages, spectators see connections beyond selfish reason, and sensativly may feel for
someone they might otherwise condemn outside the imaginary realm of the theater.
Abhinavagupta claims that it is well known that those who have karuṇa are sensitive.
Aesthetic judgment strengthens the communicability of suggested agreements in
meaning (saṃjñā). Kant’s claim about taste also seems to be that universal
communicability is a sufficient condition for aesthetic enjoyment. In the CJ Kant
considers the fact that we do not really concern ourselves objects as such in artexperiences. All cognitive beings are capable of reflection because of the same capacity
of cognition in general from one person to the next. Characters such as Medea are a
possibility for harmonizing the cognitive powers of imagination and understanding.
Rasa must also overflow in discourse. With emotive objects of art, the features of
the performance, etc., are such that constructions (vibhāvādi) are causally geared
towards making an audience response with tears, or shaking, etc.29 Thus, although a
rasa is not a personal emotion, the conjunction (saṃyoga) of the “Rasa Sūtra” occurs
in the embodied imagination of the spectator. In the mind, a certain fittingness of a
quality (guṇa, or beauty in Kant’s theory) is a sufficient condition for rasa.30 On this
point Bharata explains how rasa experience pervades the body as fire consumes dry
29

NS VII offers a framework for emotion-dispositions, and occurrent states, mirrored through emotional
contagion by spectators.
30
tatrāṣṭau bāvāḥ sthāyinaḥ / trayastriṃśadvyabhicāriṇaḥ / aṣṭau sātvikā iti bhedāḥ / evamete
kāvyarasabhivyaktihetava ekonapañcāśadbhāvāḥ pratyavagantavyāḥ / ebhyaśca sāmānyaguṇayogena
rasā niṣpadyante // (NS 7.6)
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wood (NS 7.7). 31 Abhinavagupta further describes the function of vibhāvādi in
producing aesthetic enjoyment as different from that of ordinary cause and effect.
Rather than viewing art-objects as existing in just one configuration of space and time,
aesthetic constructions are seen as real counterparts of cause and effect (causal
conditioning), but existing outside the space-time limitations of cause and effect. Thus,
the pervasion Bharata speaks of is not a logical pervasion, but rather a spreading of
awareness into the embodied spectator.
Ordinarily, a cause of emotion is an embodied response, (cognitive, if involving
beliefs) which is about specific objects, persons, etc., and vulnerabilities as such. In
contrast, vibhavādi serve the function of stepping away, in a break from the thought of
our specific distractions, etc. The quintessential term of art for rasa enjoyment,
camatkāra, is the experience of “unobstructed consciousness.” This “rest in the self”
or pleasure of aesthetic self-contentment is referred to as “repose in the heart”
(viśrānti), meaning ‘desireless appreciation’ (Chakrabarti, 2005). As Navjivan Rastogi
explains Abhinavagupta’s theory, it is a state of refined consciousness where “The
capacity to reflect others and to also identify with the reflected data is distinguishing
mark of prakāśa.” (2013, 446) 32 Imaginative causes and effects, vibhāva-s and
anubhāva-s remove the obstacles of pragmatic, egotistical, and even intellectual
concern through images. (Abh. VI, 1992) 33 Thus, karuṇa is a critically reflective
precursor to compassion. According to Bharata, the imaginative paths for creating an
experience of karuṇa are: generally seeing in the plot the obstruction (upaghāta) of
dharma, a loss of wealth, or the sorrow of a character.
The bhāva-rasa distinction is a split between thinking about particular embodied
beings versus the universalized essence of emotions, which are embodied in a
spectator’s imagination at any time. Rasa-s, real as any other feeing that is telling and
so matters, have the added result of sustaining a perspectival shift away from mere
relations of particular persons, etc., in their private vulnerabilities. This is where
karuṇa, serves as a guide to moral virtue, but is not a moral virtue of compassion
(karuṇā) in itself. The intellectual virtue of karuṇa is an insightful tendency in the
generalization process where dry, rasa-less starting points, such as one’s own desires
for family and possessions are not the basis of generalization. Inquiring in an as if
mode, imaginative possibilities are expressed in śoka, and the matter is of thinking
about the larger picture of the relationship between desire, vulnerability, and looming
31

bhavati cātra ślokaḥ—yo’artho hṛdayasaṃvādi tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ / śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena
śuṣkaṃ kāṣṭhabhivāgninā
32
In “Quintessentiality of Camatkāra in Rasa-Experience” Rastogi identifies prakāśa and vimarśa as
being and consciousness. ‘A light of consciousness’ is one way to understand ‘prakāśa’ in the idealist,
and non-dualist tradition of Śaiva metaphysics and epistemology of Self-recognition. All reality is free
playing consciousness, to be reflectively uncovered. Abhinava holds: “The mind of an aesthete is like a
clean mirror which allows instant and clear reflection of the content of experience.” (Rastogi 2013, 445)
33
As mentioned earlier, it is not necessarily so much a positive mystical achievement, but rational
elimination of seven factors: unfitting narrative, historically spatial-temporal situating of the event, being
lost in personal feelings, failure of empathetic imagination, unclarity, general irrelevance, and doubt, to
the effect of breaking the barriers of consciousness between one subject and the next (āvaraṇa-bhaṅga).
Also, Chakrabarti 2009, 197
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threats to contentment with distance. The aesthetic stance is a creative stance on the
part of the spectator, who will then be able to infuse pathos into a judgment. Contrary
to assuming judgments that begin with the first-person possessive “my” (sister,
husband, child, car, etc. or any personal tragedy therein) the convergence between
insight and feeling is critical, and unassuming. Through an unassuming insight, the
starting point of a tragic art transcends personal suffering. Since the agent as rasika
puts feeling into inquiry that is sublime in itself, and good for being moved, the
potential knower critically reflect, and feel freely. The place for moral judgment
remains in the world of personal relations, but the place of aesthetic judgment is
important for epistemological reasons. Philosophical examples and thought
experiments require the shift away from over personalizing, or the discourse will not
only lose track of the unfathomable suffering beyond one’s trivial concerns, but it will
bore the connoisseur, not move inquiry, and leave it dry.
5. KARUṆA-RASA AND THE DISPOSITION OF ‘ATTUNEMENT’
Boldly, we have already argued that a rasa is not a kind of personal emotion, even if a
personal emotion inspires the rasa experience. Linda Zagzebski remarks that some
emotions (those that are grounded in the ego) are clearly very far removed from
intellectual virtues. For this reason, reflection is needed to help to monitor the patterns
of fallibility in emotions generally. (2009, 79-80)34 On Aristotle’s view, an aesthetic
emotion may be drenched with personal interest (e.g., pity), and less trustworthy. Like
cathartic emotions, karuṇarasa is an emotion the audience feels, and not the feeling of
a performer, or character.35 In the Poetics, rapture terminates in a recognition (Greek:
anagnorisis) of personal relevance—vulnerability to fate, but emotional flooding is
directed, the surge of response has a channel and is affectively released. However, as
we have argued, egotistical concern is considered to be an obstacle to having a rasa
experience.36 But as a kind of pleasure, karuṇa-camatkāra is a wish for continuation of
itself as a righteous judgment, which is not the same as a wish for an end to suffering.
In catharsis, personal emotions might very well be expunged. If so, then the eliminative
function of catharsis actually enhances the positive production of karuṇa-rasa. But in
rasa-camatkāra the essences are savored. Aesthetic tase as tasting is an inward flow.
Through the shedding of personal concerns that the spectator is open to see more, able
to take in and observe. A distanced and contemplative judgment predominates. Thus,
there are internal grounds for thinking that karuṇa-rasa survives reflection.
Aestheticized emotions may regulate dispositions of ordinary emotions, such as pity.
According to K.C. Bhattacharya in “The Concept of Rasa” (1930), we can
functionally distinguish emotions as running on three imaginative tracks, primary,
sympathetic and contemplative. In a contemplative mode: “Artistic enjoyment is not a
34

(for virtue)
Poetics, Book XI. According to Christopher Gill: “In the Rhetoric Aristotle makes it clear he associates
ethos with the presentation, or self-presentation, and pathos with the production of the appropriate
reactions in the audience.” (1984, 153)
36
Abh. VI
35
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feeling of the enjoyer on his own account; it involves a dropping of self-consciousness,
while the feeling that is enjoyed—the feeling of the third person—is freed from its
reference to an individual subject and eternalised in the Heart Universal.” (2011, 186191) It is perfectly possible to empathize with someone who is feeling love, anger, or
disgust on their own terms, without actually feeling those same emotions. Sympathy
may be unattached to the desires of the sympathized, fictional or not. The imaginative
process of generalization in “moments of taste” constitute a path for judgment to evade
one or the other side of the Janus face of ‘desire and aversion’ linked to private
emotions. An audience who perceives universality in the feeling of an artistic
presentation, is foremost a sensitive body responsible for what it feels and the trait of
inquiring and reimagining the world. Then through imaginative play the agent learns
to make use of its freedom to circle around and know desires. The freedom of the
sympathetic imagination has an epistemic yield just insofar as the imagination is the
vehicle of contemplation leading to deeper understandings.
Kant also noticed that reflective judgment involves an attunement of cognitive
faculties. At a critical point in the Critique of Judgment, Kant mentions the attunement
between imaginative faculties that is a necessary condition for cognition to take place.
(Kant 1987, 163-4) Attunement is not itself an inference or perception. Rather,
attunement is a subjective condition for understanding. In the second moment of taste,
the universal communicability of a judgment is sensed as an attuned harmony between
the faculties of the imagination and understanding. For cognitive beings in reflective
judgment, one ought to think other persons could also be receptive to the same
harmonizing presentations. From this first level of aligning the faculties of the
imagination and understanding in terms of disinterestedness that Kant that provides, a
second level of attunement can be built on the aesthetic enjoyment that flows from
universal communicability. A possible alignment with the imaginations and
understandings of other minds might be available from reflection. In an appreciation
of the sublime,37 attunement involves seeing deeply (with feeling) existentially derived
vulnerabilities that are applicable to all sentient beings. Aestheticized tragedy brings
together two senses of attunement for an agent and creates a possibility of inquiring
with others that is otherwise difficult to achieve. In a different context, Jessica
Benjamin speaks of an in-between space that is created between a therapist and patient
with attunement to a depersonalized discourse. Benjamin believes that a basis for
attunement may rest in “mirror-neurons”:
The third-ness of attuned play resembles musical improvisation, in which both partners
follow a structure or pattern that both of them simultaneously create and surrender to, a
structure enhanced by our capacity to receive and transmit at the same time in nonverbal
interaction. The co-created third has the transitional quality of being both invented and
discovered. To the question of “Who created this pattern, you or I?” the paradoxical answer
is “Both and neither” (Benjamin 2004 18-19)

37

Kant informally comments that “the feeling for the sublime is stirred” in tragedy (1764, 51). Mostly
emotions are incongruent with taste on account of personal preferences that sappy emotions express.
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Becoming attuned to both faculties, and a narrative, inner discourse appears to be
between the listener and the narrator in a manner that accommodates others and is
analogous to an immersive form aesthetic appreciation. But insofar as we turn to others
to confirm what we ourselves see and feel, attunement is both, of the play of cognitive
faculties, and a discursive play between participants. In suddenly appreciating beauty,
the expectation that others could also harmonize with art-presentations can elicit a
demand. If the distanced nature of the discourse is lost, as may be inevitable, then the
thread takes a personal turn, like with an analyst who has lost her bearings:
…the restoration of thirdness in terms of the analyst’s recovery of self-observation, such
that “we stop doing something that we are probably not aware of doing in our interaction
with the patient.” I would characterize this…as the analyst’s regaining self-regulation and
becoming able to move out of dissociation and back into affectively resonant containment.
Another way to describe it is that the analyst has to change (2004, 32-33)38

A self-regulating second-order intellectual virtue of attunement is the capacity tap back
into the narrative framework. In karuṇa-rasa, the rasika reflects according to an
attuning schema of observation, and distance. The relation between knower, and
possibly known, is sustained by the imagination. In imagining a possibility, one may
envision general connections of vulnerability. The rasa-resonance of emotive art is a
peculiar kind of knowledge, outside of a single tense, falling into a category of reality
which is not applicable only to specific things (Abhinavagupta, 1992, 35-38, Gnoli,
1956). In consciously maintaining a suggested dimension of third-ness, pathos allows
deeper insight into apt connections between emotions and vulnerabilities.39
This kind of evaluation is described as the state of impersonal subjectivity
belonging to a de-centered self where evaluations judge the telling of a sorrow on its
own terms. 40 It is an understanding of subjectivity that does not entail unsharable
individual feelings or privacy. (Boruah 2016)41 The result for the spectator, according
to the classical rasika, Viśvanātha, is that there is no exclusive access to rasa, it is
communal. Arindam Chakrabarti (2009, 189) translates Viśvanātha’s playful
description of rasa in the Sāhityadarpaṇa as a reductio of emotional sorts, “another
person’s, yet not quite another person’s, mine, but not just mine” (Viśvanātha 2016,
47). This resembles the schema of third-ness where attunement is possible. Though we
do at times picture a rasa as a desire-less emotion because it is distanced, even then, a
38

The “intersubjective view of thirdness” has the structure of sharability in a reflective conceptual
analysis.
39
Pace Benjamin, who is concerned with attunement in a therapeutic context of psychoanalysis, the
subject in a decentered state decides on the aptness of second-order desires, neither being swept away,
nor invasively observing.
40
Boruah makes a strong case for aesthetic emotions as a second kind of evaluative judgment in “The
impersonal Subjectivity of Aesthetic Emotion”, which sets a framework for the normativity of aesthetic
emotions as meaningful but objectiveless judgments.
41
Granted, the intention here is to adhere to a particular construal which strongly emphasizes the nonprivate nature of aesthetic experience along with Viśvanatha on the topic in the Sāhityadarpaṇa (The
Mirror on Composition)
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second-order desire regulates openness to truth and aversion to ignorance. Karuṇarasa
renegotiates resistance, under-distancing, and over-distancing in empathetic
engagement. Since rasa does not belong to anyone in particular, karuṇa is not a private
sorrow. But neither is rasa an objective judgment. A ‘subject’ who experiences rasa is
the condition for having rasa. We create, as Benjamin implies with her third-ness, a
subject-subject kind of relation. In rasa terms, attunement must rest on a unifity of the
subject who engages in contemplation (vimarśa) and the subject who shines forth
(prākaśa). 42 The exact opposite of a didactic tally, karuṇarasa is an open-ended
process of judging the world without determining one’s own place in it.
The intellectually sensitive observer recognizes that understanding is subjective. But
the check on both ourselves and others is a response to an apt-emotion as it is presented
in a narrative. The artwork, poetry and narrative, etc., provides a set of relations for us to
respond to and exercise our capacities. Thus, artistic presentations create a kind of a third
space that belongs to no one in particular, but is shared by anyone. Not that all arts convey
tragic emotion, but karuṇarasa always conveys a process of universalization where
achieving aesthetic enjoyment means that one is receptive to generalizing feelings. This
third space is cognitively (and not just pragmatically) significant is because of an
expansion of the faculties which occurs in the in-between space of self and others. As
K.C. Bhattacharya mentioned, there needs to be an initial track of sentiency as a condition.
The Kantian attunement of the faculties starts on the ground level. Some art-objects and
narratives seem to make us sense a harmony, and about others we will not feel attuned
to the expression, even though it is the faculties that are un-attuned.
6. CONCLUSION
As a mean between extremes with a proper motivational component from balancing
care for self and others on the level of selflessness, we can hardly interpret karuṇā the
way Aristotle interprets character virtues. The Māhāyāna school’s Śāntideva would
concede the point, a virtue of compassion is not merely experiencing the pain of
another.43 An Aristotelian would keep the virtue centered in the self, and concerned
with the good it does for the self. Like for Aquinas, other beings are entrenched with
the “self” as a means to virtue. Conversely, the bodhisattva is responsible for the
liberation of all sentient beings from saṃsāra in virtue of mutual identification. Great
compassion is an outcome of sentiency, and a grasping of the fact that a sentient
42

And from Abhinavagupta’s world view, the primordial pair Śiva-Śakti manifested by the soul for the
sake of aesthetic enjoyment, or knowledge of Brahmā, references in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad to
which Bharata himself was aware of. R.K. Sen. Aesthetic Enjoyment (1960, 17)
43
Charles Goodman notes “Central to the spiritual practice of the Theravāda is the cultivation of four
qualities known as the Four Divine Abidings (brahma-vihāra); these are lovingkindness (metta),
compassion (karuṇā), sympathetic joy (pamudita), and equanimity (upekkhā).” (2009, 52) In theory,
great compassion (mahākaruṇā) that embraces all of life transcends ordinary compassion and
compassion that is considered impersonal. Though the radically different soteriological doctrines of rasa
theorists and Mahāyāna Buddhism are at odds in the debate over the reality of a Self, the narrative of
universal suffering that is to be affectively grasped, and grades of emotion to be transcended on levels
of selflessness, entails that the generalization of suffering is at stake for epistemic reasons.
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response can be de-centered. In the ontological identification between the self and
others, and the emptiness of both, suffering supposedly becomes ownerless, and hence,
any pain is both massive, and in some sense trivial. Against this kind of a no-self view,
Abhinavagupta maintains a stance that makes a transition away from selfishness
possible, but only on the condition that the nature of aesthetizization is a self. In the
rasa experience, which is a free play, there is a breaking of conceptual distinctions
constituting individual selves. From a vantage point of karuṇarasa, an array of ordinary
emotions that Nussbaum describes are necessarily connected:
If we now consider in a more general way the passage from one emotion to another, we
find that we now have a deeper understanding of why the emotions should be grouped
together as a class. It is not only that fear, grief, anger, love, and the others all share certain
features…It is that they have a dynamic relation to one another (2002, 97).

The causal links are invisible, and they tear people apart into their own private
suffering. Observing selfish sorrow, and the icy distance between harmer and harmed,
the relations between self and other shine forth. To aestheticize emotions is to take the
evaluative response out its ordinary context, to be moved by observing the subject, of
say Ophelia, as she plays out. Beliefs are not an important part of the cognitive value
of rasa, but choosing how to judge beliefs and desires is part of aesthetic experience.
Inquiry can change beliefs, desires and emotion.
The methodology of the rasa theorists who suppose that aesthetic enjoyment is real,
and that our theory of emotions fit with what is presented on stage, Bharata and
Abhinavagupta, make enactment test of aptness for karuṇa. Without presupposing the
truth of any view, Buddhist or otherwise, Abhinavagupta often takes many conflicting
views and finds insights that each one has to offer. He accepts points from his idealist
Buddhist opponents, and he uses examples of Buddhist literature in discussing the rasa
most linked to soteriological aims, śānta (in the Abhinavabhāratī). His insight there is
that discourse and aesthetic enjoyment transcends tenets. Ordinary compassion might
be a ‘way of knowing’ other minds. However, karuṇa has a different structure and
suggests a different intervention in inquiry. Self-understanding is by a sentient agent
constituted by emotions, and is more accessible in an aesthetic context because as
tragedy becomes truly unselfish, the rasika--a freely judging agent--steps out of the
personal-impersonal dichotomy into an epistemic domain in which the emotion belongs
to everyone and no one in particular who share in a capacity of sentience. Augmented
by reflection, relishable-sorrow moves the questioner who may transform karuṇa
imaginings into genuine wisdom.
The emotion-disposition of ‘attunement’ adds to inquiry an alignment with the
imaginations and understandings of others in order to create a holistic picture of
knowers. The attuned spectator observes, and notices more than with reliabilist virtues.
As pathos, or a reflective emotion, karuṇa can be regulative of intellectual virtues.
Selfish sorrow leading to biased understanding is challenged in the aesthetic
transformation of tragedy. As a reflective judgment, karuna is a refuge from even
others’ vulnerabilities. Aestheticizing tragedy complements inquiry because not only
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does appreciation involve inherently pleasurable emotions when ordinary counterparts
are painful and cause the agent to retreat from a discourse, the aesthetic context also
involves an evaluation of pleasure separate from personal preferences. Because we are
able to know feelings free from desire in judging a tragic circumstance, the aptness of
feeling karuṇarasa raises other critical questions, including the second order question:
how ought one feel? We can now mark that karuṇarasa is epistemically relevant in a
new way.
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